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Korea legislated withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment after the Korean 
Supreme Court Decision on Grandma Kim’s Case. However, the Proposal for Legislation by 
the Korean National Bioethics Committee and the Supreme Court decision have some 
limitations. Both limits the patient’s ability to decide to withdraw or withhold life-
sustaining treatment to cases involving a dying patient who is about to die. The Hospice 
and Life-sustaining Treatment Act also reflected this limitation. Only POLST signed by 
competent patients themselves is fully respected as a patient’s wishes. The Supreme Court 
decision reveals theoretical confusion between the principle of respecting autonomy and 
that of a patient’s best interest. Even though the Proposal and the Act outline certain 
procedures for surrogate decision-making, they may be problematic in that they place a 
heavy weight on family members’ decision making. This limitation should be overcome 
with ethical, legal, and sociological studies. Despites this limitation, any legislation based 
on the Proposal was needed in Korea. Building a medical system with better palliative care 
or hospice care should be emphasized to prevent the abuse of withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment. The values of familism should be balanced with those of autonomy.
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Introduction
Legislation regarding withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment 
has been a controversial issue in Korea. The Congress passed the Hospice-
Palliative Care and Decision on Life-sustaining Treatment Care of Dying 
Patients Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ or ‘the Hospice and Life-
sustaining Treatment Act’) this February. The Boramae Hospital case made 
physicians worry about being convicted of murder even though this case 
should be considered to be a case of discharge against medical advice. 
Grandma Kim’s case prompted a wrong response from physicians. The 
Korean Supreme Court decision on Grandma Kim’s Case is the first case to 
deal with the genuine bioethical issues relevant to life-sustaining treatment in 
Korea. After the decision, the Korean National Bioethics Committee 
presented its Proposal for Legislation on Life-sustaining Treatment. The 
Proposal has legal and social significance in that it suggests a basic 
framework for such legislation while considering the main contents of the 
Decision and trying to reflect various voices. 
However, the decision and the Proposal also have some fundamental 
limitations, which affected the Act. Critical review of the decision and the 
Proposal will contribute to the development of the future agenda for 
bioethical issues in Korea. After I deal with these limitations, I emphasize the 
need to balance the values of autonomy and those of familism and suggest a 
need for more empirical studies on bioethical issues related to autonomy and 
surrogate decision-making. 
Grandma Kim’s Case
The legal case of Grandma Kim vs. Severance Hospital is the first one to deal 
with withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in Korea from bioethical 
perspectives. Some may say that the Boramae Hospital case is the first legal 
case to deal with withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Even 
though the case has prompted Korean medical practitioners to behave very 
conservatively due to the fear that physicians will be charged with murder, it 
does not have any meaningful bioethical implications since it involves a type 
of discharge against medical advice. Cleary it was ethically wrong to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment for the patient in the Boramae Hospital 
case. The patient himself did not have any wishes to withhold or withdraw his 
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life-sustaining treatment. His surrogate decision maker, his wife, did not have 
any intention to act in his best interest. The attending physician did not think 
that the life-sustaining treatment was medically futile.
Grandma Kim’s case is similar to Karen Quinlan’s case. Grandma Kim, a 
77-year-old, was incompetent. Her mouth and nose were clogged with a 
ventilator and feeding tube (after excessive bleeding caused by a botched 
endoscopy operation). Her family members requested Severance Hospital to 
remove the ventilator (not the feeding tube) on her behalf.
Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court upheld an appellate court ruling that allowed the 
removal of the ventilator from the patient, who was dying and had little 
chance of living. We have to pay attention to some important points from the 
Supreme Court Decision (2009DA17417). First, the Supreme Court 
theoretically declared a patient’s right to self-determination regarding 
treatments in general. But it was also emphasized that when a treatment is 
directly related to a patient’s life (that is, death), the decision to stop the 
treatment must be decided very carefully under very restricted circumstances.
Second, the Supreme Court decision provides general guidelines for 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. For life-sustaining 
devices to be removed, the following four conditions must be met; 1) Dying 
patient; with no possibility of recovering consciousness; no possibility of 
recovering his/her important physical functions related to life; it is clear that 
he or she will die soon; treatment (life-sustaining treatment) does not aim to 
improve the condition, but aims to keep the current condition. In this 
situation, treatment is considered to artificially delay the end period in the 
process toward death. 
2) Patient’s self-determination; a patient’s right to self-determination 
may be considered to be exercised when a Letter of Advance Medical Intent 
(like AD in the U.S.A except for Durable Power of Attorney, thus similar to a 
living will) was made with a physician after a competent patient obtains 
sufficient information from a physician. (If a LAMI was not made under the 
above conditions, it is merely a kind of objective evidence that may be used to 
estimate a patient’s wishes.).
3) For dying patients without LAMI; a patient’s wishes can be 
objectively estimated with objective evidence including a patient’s expression 
to family members and friends, his/her reactions to treatments for other 
patients, his/her religion and way of life, and his/her medical condition, etc. 
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4) Committee’s judgment; it is desirable that a committee consisting of 
specialists decides whether a patient is a dying patient with no possibility of 
recovery if a patient or his/her family does not appeal to court for the 
decision.
With regards to the conditions above, Grandma Kim’s case belongs to 
the category, “dying patients without a living will” (#3 in the list above). The 
removal of Grandma Kim’s ventilator was based on the following reasons. 
The decision says:
It is reasonable and in accordance with social norms that we accept that we 
can presume a patient’s wish to stop life-sustaining treatment when the 
patient might be considered to choose to stop life-sustaining treatment if a 
chance for the exercise of the right to self-determination were given to the 
patient because stopping life-sustaining treatment is considered to 
objectively be in the patient’s best interest in terms of the patient’s values or 
beliefs.”(My italics)
Comments on the Reasons of the Decision and Its Implications
In the section of the decision quoted above, the “right to self-determination” 
(that is, “autonomy”) and the patient’s “best interest” are seemingly conflated. 
This means that the principle of respect for autonomy and that of best 
interest are mixed up.
The principle of respect for autonomy is involved in the phrase, “when 
the patient might be considered to choose to stop life-sustaining treatment if 
a chance for the exercise of the right to self-determination were given to the 
patient.” And the principle of best interest is involved in the phrase, “stopping 
life-sustaining treatment is considered to objectively fit to the patient’s best 
interest in terms of the patient’s values or beliefs.”
How do we have to interpret the decision’s appeal to the two principles? 
The logical structure of the decision should be interpreted in accordance with 
the “substituted judgment” standard (Choe & Kim 2009, p. 167). The appeal 
to the principle of respecting autonomy implies that we may accept a patient’s 
decision although it may not quite be in his/her best interest from a medical 
perspective. If we did not interpret the decision to follow the “substituted 
judgment” standard, the decision might sound absurd because it appeals to 
the two, often conflicting, principles. 
According to Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, there are three 
standards for surrogate decision making; 1) the substituted judgment 
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standard, 2) the pure autonomy standard, and 3) the best interests standard 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013, pp. 226-9). However, the first standard has a 
serious problem in that it cannot apply to a person who has never been 
competent. More importantly, when we seriously consider the substituted 
judgment standard, we must ultimately reach either the pure autonomy 
standard or the best interest standard. For the basic premise of the substituted 
judgment standard rests on a fiction (Beauchamp & Childress 2009, p. 136).
Thus, we should follow the pure autonomy standard when we try to 
estimate a patient’s wishes. Beauchamp and Childress say, “The pure 
autonomy standard applies exclusively to formerly autonomous, now-
incompetent patients who expressed a relevant, autonomous treatment 
preference.” They continue to say, “The principle of respect for autonomy 
compels us to respect such preferences” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, pp. 
227-8). This suggests that respecting a patient’s preferences depends on how 
much the principle of respect for autonomy prevails in a specific society. In 
addition, the acceptance of the pure autonomy standard presupposes that we 
have to know a patient’s wish. As Beauchamp and Childress say, “This 
standard asserts that, whether or not a formal advance directive exits, 
caretakers should act on the patient’s prior autonomous judgments, 
sometimes called ‘precedent autonomy’” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 
228). In this respect, it is reasonable that objective evidence is requested in 
order to ascertain a patient’s prior autonomous judgments.
What do we have to do if we do not know or cannot estimate a patient’s 
wishes on the basis of objective evidence? In this circumstance, we should 
follow the best interests standard. Beauchamp and Childress say, “If the 
previously competent person left no reliable traces of his or her preferences - 
or if the individual was never competent – surrogate decision makers should 
adhere to the best interests standard” (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, p. 229). 
They also say, “Under the best interests standard, a surrogate decision maker 
must then determine the highest probable net benefit among the available 
options, assigning different weights to interest the patient has in each option 
balanced against their inherent risks, burdens, or costs” (Beauchamp & 
Childress 2013, p. 228).
Finally, the Supreme Court decision does not provide reasons that quite 
adhere to theoretical standards for surrogate decision making. Its stated 
reasons reveal the misuse of the relevant terms. The use of “right to self-
determination” is not proper because the actual reason of the decision is 
based on the patient’s best interest. One may argue that the use of “right to 
self-determination” can be considered to follow the substituted judgment 
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standard. However, the substituted judgment standard has to consider a 
patient’s hypothetical decision under a given situation guessing the patient’s 
wishes rather than the best interest of the patient. The Court’s discussion of 
“the patient’s best interest in terms of the patient’s values or beliefs” also 
reveals that the Court does not properly use the term “best interest” (Choi 
2014, p. 243).
In addition, the decision has the following limitations. First, the Supreme 
Court limited the removal of life-sustaining treatment to dying patients who 
will die soon because it considers life-sustaining treatments applied to dying 
patients to artificially delay the end period in the process toward death. We 
have to allow for the fact that Korea does not have any regulations to legally 
assure a patient’s refusal of medical treatment whereas the U.S.A. has the 
Patient’s Self-determination Act to assure the right.
Second, the Supreme Court limits the power of LAMI (i.e. living wills) 
made without a physician. According to the Court’s decision, a LAMI made 
without a physician is merely one kind of objective evidence to identify or 
estimate a patient’s wish. Generally, living will is this kind of LAMI unlike 
POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment). Thus, we can 
conclude that LAMI made without a physician, that is, living wills in general 
cannot be legally considered to be the exercise of the right to self-
determination. What legal power living wills as a form of objective evidence 
may have is likely to depend on how strongly Korean society intends to 
respect a patient’s wishes. I wonder if Korean society will fully respect a 
patient’s wishes. The mixture of the principles discussed above and the 
misuse of the terms relevant to surrogate decision making both indicate that 
Korean society and the Supreme Court are not ready to fully accept a patient’s 
refusal of treatment. This is also apparent when we compare the Supreme 
Court’s reasons for its decision with the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasons 
in Nancy Cruzan’s case. The Supreme Court of Missouri says;
We assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent 
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and 
nutrition. … Missouri has in effect recognized that under certain circumstances 
a surrogate may act for the patient in electing to have hydration and nutrition 
withdrawn in such a way as to cause death, but it has established a procedural 
safeguard to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as best it may 
to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent. Missouri requires 
that evidence of the incompetent’s wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment 
be proved by clear and convincing evidence (Shepherd 2009, p. 741.).
157Legal and Ethical Issues Regarding End-of-Life Care in Korea
The Court’s acknowledgement of the right to refuse treatment including even 
hydration and nutrition is noteworthy, as is the emphasis on clear and 
convincing evidence of an incompetent patient’s wishes in the case of 
surrogate decision making rather than any mention of “a patient’s best 
interest.”
Proposal for Legislation by National Bioethics Committee in 
Korea
The Proposal for Legislation 
The National Bioethics Committee in Korea put forward the Proposal for 
Legislation on Life-Sustaining Treatment in July 2013. The Proposal is as 
follows. First, the Proposal limits the condition of a patient who is eligible for 
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment as a dying patient;  
1) with no possibility of recuperating;
2) who is not reactive to treatment for his/her disease; 
3) who deteriorates rapidly.
Second, the treatments that are subject to the decision to withdraw or 
withhold are special life-sustaining kinds of medicine (so called “extra-
ordinary treatment” such as CPR; ventilator; hemodialysis; anticancer drugs, 
etc.). Ordinary treatments such as feeding tubes, palliative care, etc. are 
excluded according to the first version of the Proposal, although the final 
Proposal does not clearly mention what ordinary treatments are.
Third, the frame of decision making is as follows: 1) Clear and current 
wishes from a patient should be respected. A Plan for Life-sustaining 
Treatment made with an attending physician after the patient is informed of 
current or soon to occur conditions and can make a rational decision is 
recommended. In addition, a Letter of Advance Medical Intent made with an 
attending physician is accepted as a patient’s clear and current wishes.
2) When there are no clear and current wishes from a patient, a patient’s 
wishes can be estimated in the following ways. A Letter of Advance Medical 
Intent made without physicians can be treated and accepted as a patient’s 
wishes after two physicians (one attending physician and one expert 
physician) review this LAMI. Alternatively, concordant statements from 
more than two family members can be treated and accepted as a patient’s 
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wishes after two physicians (one attending physician and one expert 
physician) review these statements.
3) When there are no clear and current wishes from a patient and no 
possibilities to estimate a patient’s wishes, the following procedures can be 
taken after two physicians conduct a review:
i) a legally appropriate attorney can make the best decision for the 
patient, ii) all members of the family (spouse, descendants, and ascendants 
only) can make the best decision for the patient, iii) the hospital ethics 
committee can make the best decision for the patient when there are no 
family members.
Comments on the Proposal
The Proposal had great significance for Korean society in that it proposed a 
framework for any legislation on life-sustaining treatment. In addition, the 
Proposal was significant in that it had been made by an ad hoc committee 
that included many experts working under the National Bioethics 
Committee. However, the Proposal still has the following limitations. First, 
the Proposal focuses only on dying patients who will die soon. A terminally 
ill patient is outside of the Proposal. This exclusion mirrors the Supreme 
Court decision regarding Grandma Kim’s case. The Act has the same 
limitation. If patients do not receive hospice care, then the withdrawal or 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment is applied only to dying patients, not 
to terminally ill patients. 
Second, the Proposal, like the Supreme Court decision, limits the power 
of a Letter of Advance Medical Intent (LAMI). A LAMI made without a 
physician may not be fully respected and may be accepted as a patient’s 
wishes after the review of two physicians (one attending physician and one 
expert physician). The power of such a LAMI is likely to depend on how the 
LAMI was made. Thus, the Act introduces an organization designated by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare. The unit registers and manages Letters of 
Advance Medical Intent for Life-sustaining Treatment. The Act reflects the 
consideration of strong opinions against LAMI made without a physician. 
The Korean Catholic Church has worried about the abuse of LAMI. The 
Church seriously takes into account the Korean medical context in which 
national medical insurance does not yet fully cover the financial burden for 
terminally ill-patients or their family members, including the cost of 
palliative or hospice care.
Third, the proposal gives great weight to family members when it comes 
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to surrogate decision making. Family members may have too much power 
and face conflicts of interest. This phenomenon may be understood to reflect 
an aspect of Korean culture known as “familism.” Hospitals have 
conventionally asked family members to make a decision on behalf of a 
patient. However, there is no clear and sufficient evidence based on survey 
research to justify this kind of institutionalized respect for familism. 
According to Kwon et al., 59% of patients surveyed want to designate their 
spouse as their proxy while 30% of them want their offspring to serve as their 
proxy and only 5% of them want physicians. But only 20% of patients’ 
guardians say that they are sufficiently aware of their patient’s view of life, 
values, and wishes regarding treatment options when faced with an 
irreversible condition. 60% of patients’ guardians say they are “roughly aware 
of” these factors, and 12% of them say they are “not aware of” them (Kwon et 
al. 2010, pp. 7-8). Thus, we still need more sociological studies on whether 
our respect for familism is valid or not.
Fourth, how two physicians review LAMI, family members’ statements, 
and a proxy’s decision is not clear. I doubt if physicians are eligible for the 
above tasks because such a review may go beyond physicians’ abilities. The 
same procedures are regulated in the Act. Thus, the same question is raised 
with regards to the Act.  
Comments on the Hospice and Life-sustaining Treatment Act 
The problems of the Supreme Court decision and the Proposal arise with 
regards to the Act because the Act was written with those documents in 
mind. Besides these familiar considerations the Act has a unique problem. 
The Act does not only deal with the life-sustaining treatment problem, but 
also with hospice or palliative care for terminally ill patients. The Act is 
significant in that it expands hospice or palliative care to terminally ill 
patients beyond cancer patients whereas previously the Management of 
Cancer Patients Act dealt with palliative care only for cancer patients. But the 
unique problems of the Hospice and Life-sustaining Treatment Act come 
from the mixture of the Bill on Life-sustaining Treatment and the Bill to 
modify the Management of Cancer Patients Act. 
First, there is no clear regulation of the relationship between withholding 
life-sustaining treatment and receiving hospice care. Hospice practices 
involve the withholding of life-sustaining treatment. But the failure to clearly 
mention this in the Hospice and Life-sustaining Treatment Act may mislead 
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citizens and some health care professionals into the idea that withholding 
life-sustaining treatment must be applied to only dying patients, rather than 
terminally ill patients who receive hospice care. 
Second, the Act has the double standard of surrogate decision making. 
As with the Management of Cancer Patients Act the Act allows for a system 
of surrogate decision making, such as durable power of attorney in the case of 
hospices. This means that a non-family member proxy for a patient receiving 
hospice care may withhold life-sustaining treatment for a terminally ill 
patient while only family members may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment for dying patients. A more significant problem is that there are no 
detailed regulations on how proxies for patients in hospice care will be 
designated. 
Importance of Considering Social and Cultural Context
Although the Proposal and the Supreme Court decision have some 
limitations, the Act based on the Proposal has a significant meaning for 
Korean society as the first step towards policies on life-sustaining treatment. 
The above limitations are expected to be overcome with more accurate 
ethical, legal, and sociological studies. I argue that any legislation based on 
the Proposal is better than no legislation. The status quo in medical settings 
causes lots of problems involving the application of medically futile treatment 
only because many physicians are worried about being convicted of murder.
Building a Medical System for Palliative Care or Hospices
Before the Act is enforced, however, we have to build a solid medical system 
for palliative care or hospices. Palliative care is limited in Korea. Hospice or 
Palliative care is financially supported for cancer patients alone by the Korean 
National Health Insurance system. Thus, other terminally ill patients are 
likely to be reluctant to choose hospice care.
To build such a medical system, we must also overcome cultural 
problems related to end-of-life care. A patient’s sons or daughters are inclined 
to do their best to make their parents survive as long as possible even if they 
know that life-sustaining treatments are futile. The reason is that they are 
very sensitive to society’s perceptions. In addition, this aspect of Korean 
culture unfortunately leads the decision to receive hospice care to be regarded 
as giving up on the hope of treating the patient.
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Financial support for hospice care should be extended to all terminally 
ill patients at the end of their lives. The Hospice and Life-sustaining 
Treatment Act still has limitations because the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare should decide the legal scope of terminally ill patients. In addition, 
an educational program dealing with death as well as end-of-life care 
including hospice care should be developed. Furthermore, familism and the 
ideal of an individual’s autonomy should also both be critically reviewed from 
various perspectives including cultural ones. Policy makers should try to 
rebuild social systems such as the medical insurance system in which 
individuals may freely pursue their own wishes beyond the mere emphasis on 
autonomy. 
Autonomy and Familism
Respecting autonomy has been one of the most important principles in 
medical ethics since Beauchamp and Childress wrote their famous 
monograph, Principles of Biomedical Ethics and the Belmont Report was 
published. The principle of autonomy sometimes seems to dominate 
solutions for lots of bioethical issues in Eastern societies as well as in Western 
ones. Recently, new approaches to understanding autonomy have been 
developed in Western culture. Some suggest a notion of “relational 
autonomy” that challenges the individualistic fantasy. Some Western and 
Eastern scholars have emphasized the values of family rather than those of 
the individual. For example, John Hardwig expresses the idea that one may 
have a moral obligation to die for one’s family member in his article, “Is There 
a Duty to Die?” (Hardwig 1997) He also argues that a family should make the 
treatment decision when the lives of family members would be dramatically 
affected by the treatment decision in his article, “What About the Family” 
(Hardwig 1990). It is true that historically individual autonomy has been 
emphasized with the advance of an individualistic society. Autonomy as a 
value along with free will, however, cannot be devalued when we are 
considering the foundation of morality, especially modern morality (Choi 
2015, p. 83). 
Hardwig criticizes the notion of individualistic autonomy. He suggests 
that family should be seriously considered (Hardwig 1997). I agree with 
Hardwig’s view that an individual has to have responsibility for his/her family 
members. This kind of discussion may be valuable for the Western societies 
in which an individual’s individualistic free choice has enjoyed the absolute 
priority. On the other hand most of the elderly in Korea, however, feel a 
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moral obligation to their offspring. Hardwig’s view is not something new in 
Eastern cultures. When they say they do not want any life-sustaining 
treatments, Korean seniors are considering the fact that such treatments are 
likely to waste money that could otherwise be used for the benefit of their 
offspring. Most Korean people do not have an individualistic fantasy. The 
reality is in fact the opposite. Koreans may feel the burden of tight 
relationships among family members. In this respect, Hardwig’s point that 
there are moral obligations to family members may not be salient in Eastern 
societies which have not yet fully developed the value of autonomy. Family 
members should participate in the process of decision-making for life-
sustaining treatment and hospice care, etc., not in decision-making in itself. 
The decision of family members is not the same as that of an individual 
person. The latter cannot be reduced to the former (Choi 2015, p. 86-7).
When we do not know what wishes an individual has even though we 
have to decide on behalf of an incompetent patient, we may accept the 
standard of best interest for a patient. We have to note that conflicts of 
interest may be involved in a decision when a family decides instead of an 
individual because family members have in most cases a burden to pay 
medical fees (Choi 2015, p. 86-7). 
Conclusion
A competent patient should appreciate the value of family and take into 
account the family member’s values and needs. But the final decision should 
be made by an individual if he/she is competent (Choi 2015, p. 88). The 
patient’s family members cannot replace the patient’s own right to self-
determination, which has been developed over the course of modernity. If the 
patient is not competent and we know or estimate his/her wishes on the basis 
of objective evidence, we should respect the patient’s wishes. In this situation, 
we follow the standard of pure autonomy that Beauchamp and Childress 
mention (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, pp. 226-9). The Proposal and 
Hospice and Life-sustaining Treatment Act consider concordant statements 
from more than two family members as a patient’s wishes as long as there is 
no objective evidence to override these statements. This is a very unique 
approach to objective evidence to reveal a patient’s wishes. Provisionally, I 
accept this approach as a proper one to reflect Korean culture. But we need a 
future empirical study on whether this approach is being abused or not. 
If the patient is not competent and we do not know his/her wishes, the 
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standard of best interest should be accepted as Beauchamp and Childress 
mention (Beauchamp & Childress 2013, pp. 226-9). In this situation, family 
members may participate in the decision-making. The Proposal and The Act 
let all members of the family (spouse, descendants, and ascendants only) 
make a decision on behalf of the patient. But family members’ decision must 
be made on the basis of the best interest of the patient with special 
consideration of the potential for conflicts of interest. In this respect, the two 
physicians’ review of the family members’ decision is important. Although 
the Act does not clearly mention what the two physicians should pay 
attention to, it is very clear from a theoretical perspective that they must 
review whether the decision all members of the family made fits together 
with the best interest of the patient.
Finally, I emphasize the idea that the value of an individual and that of 
his/her family should be balanced. If the value of family is relatively 
underestimated, we have to emphasize its importance like Hardwig. If the 
value of an individual is relatively underestimated like in Korean society, we 
have to balance this value with an emphasis on autonomy. In Eastern 
cultures, especially Korean culture, autonomy is still an important value that 
needs to be developed over the coming years (Choi 2015, p. 90). Korea 
cannot deny the value of autonomy that has developed over the course of 
modernity. The Supreme Court decision, the Proposal, and the Hospice and 
Life-sustaining Treatment Act do not ignore the value of self-determination. 
Thus, the success of the Act will depend on how many terminally ill patients 
make POLST with their physicians when they are competent. 
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